REMARKS

In response to the Office Action mailed on June 4, 2004, Applicants respectfully request reconsideration. Claims 1-51 are pending in this Application. Claims 1, 12, 23, 25, 27, 33, 39, 41, 43, 46, and 49 are independent claims and the remaining claims are dependent claims. In this Response, no claims have been amended. Applicants believe that the claims as presented are in condition for allowance.

Claims 1-9,11-20, and 22-51 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being obvious over Augustine et al., U.S. Patent No. 6,574,630 (hereinafter Augustine) in view of Salo et al., U.S. Patent No. 6,909,148 (hereinafter Salo). Claims 10 and 21 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being obvious over Augustine, Salo, and Nelson, U.S. Patent No. 6,496,568 (hereinafter Nelson).

Applicants respectfully traverse and argue that the presently claimed invention is not anticipated by any teaching in the combined Augustine and Salo references. Accordingly, Applicants request withdrawal of the present rejections.

Independent claims 1, 12, 23, 25, 27, 33, 39, 41, 43, 46, and 49 all recite receiving (or generating) an "event notification string... and identification information that identifies an executable resource capable of processing the event information." (Emphasis added). The independent claims thus require additional information that identifies "an executable resource" that is to process the event information.

Augustine, et al. fails to teach or imply the presence of any such additional "identification information" within the event notification that "identifies" any "executable resource" within events manager 101 that is to process the event notification. Instead, as noted in the previous response to the Office Action first rejecting over Augustine, Augustine teaches that all processing operations occur within events manager 101 solely under the events manager's control and

without any direction or identification <u>by the source of the event notification string</u> of what resource is to do the processing.

Thus, as conceded by the Examiner in the most recent Office Action, there is no teaching or suggestion anywhere in the Augustine reference that would lead one of ordinary skill in the art to conclude that Augustine's "event notifications" indicate how or by what "executable resource" the event notification information is to be processed.

The Examiner now asserts that Salo supplies this required element previously found missing in Augustine. A close review of the Salo reference, however, shows no teaching or implication of "identification information that identifies an <u>executable resource</u> capable of <u>processing</u> the event information" as recited in each independent claim (emphasis added).

Salo teaches a system that provides "notification in circumstances where the user requests to be notified on a particular input device under predetermined conditions." (Column 18, lines 10-12.) Salo further teaches that "[t]he subscriber states his or her preferences for notification, such as what events trigger a notification in which input device or devices should be notified of the triggering event." (Column 18, lines 15-18." The Examiner appears to be using Salo's teaching of subscriber preferences as a substitute for the recited claim element "identification information." Applicants respectfully submit that, as taught by Salo, subscriber (or "user") preferences are nothing more than the subscriber's wishes as to what should happen in the future when a "notifiable" event (i.e., an event the subscriber wishes to be notified about) occurs. Nothing in Salo indicates that the term "preferences" has any meaning other than the example given in column 18, lines 16-18: "such as what events trigger a notification and which input device or devices should be notified of the triggering event."

The independent claims of the present application all recite a particular and precise definition of "identification information." "Identification information" is

information "that identifies an executable resource capable of processing the event information." See, e.g., claim 1. This definition requires <u>identification</u> of an <u>executable resource</u> that can <u>process</u> information describing the event. The user preferences taught by Salo do not identify <u>any</u> "executable resource," nor do they teach or imply "processing the event information" as recited in the independent claims. Rather, Salo only teaches the announcement of an event by the delivery of a notification message to a predetermined input device or devices. There is no teaching of any "processing" of information describing the event; no "executable resource" is invoked.

Accordingly, for failing to teach all of the elements of each independent claim, the combination of the Salo and Augustine references cannot anticipate any of the independent claims, thus negating the present obviousness rejection. Furthermore, as each dependent claim depends from an unanticipated base claim, each dependent claim is therefore allowable for at least the same reasons as its respective base claim.

Claims 10 and 21 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103 as being obvious over Augustine and Salo in view of Nelson, U.S. Patent No. 6,496,568 (hereinafter Nelson). As implicitly conceded by the Examiner, while Nelson generally teaches an event notification system, it neither teaches nor implies a system wherein the event notification <u>itself</u> contains "identification information that identifies an executable resource capable of processing the event information," as recited in each independent claim. Since Salo (discussed above) fails to supply this missing element, Nelson (either considered alone or in combination with Augustine and Salo) also cannot form a basis for an obviousness rejection: the proposed combination still fails to teach all elements of each independent claim. As all independent claims are thus distinguished over Nelson, as well as Nelson in combination with Augustine and Salo, the present obviousness rejection of dependent claims 10 and 21 is therefore moot.

There is no fee required. If the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office deems a fee necessary, this fee may be charged to the account of the undersigned, Deposit Account No. <u>50-0901</u>.

If the enclosed papers or fees are considered incomplete, the Patent Office is respectfully requested to contact the undersigned collect at (508) 366-9600, in Westborough, Massachusetts.

Respectfully submitted,

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